EXPANSION OF THE TERRITORY OF THE TRANS-KUBAN SETTLEMENT IN THE 40S OF THE 19TH CENTURY
- Authors: Shapovalov S.N.
- Issue: Vol 19, No 2 (2023)
- Pages: 371-384
- URL: https://caucasushistory.ru/2618-6772/article/view/1890
- DOI: https://doi.org/10.32653/CH192371-384
Abstract
The establishment of new stanitsas (Cossack villages) as part of the Trans-Kuban (Zakubanye) settlement was caused by the needs of those who had already moved to the lands of the North-Western Caucasus and needed to be settled without military intervention to oust the mountaineers from their lands. The article aims to demonstrate the resettlement and colonization capacities of the Trans-Kuban settlement in the 1840s to understand the features of settlement and development of the lands of the North-Western Caucasus and the north-eastern coast of the Black Sea by the population of the Russian Empire. The application of the frontier theory allowed us to consider the Russian advance to the North-Western Caucasus not only as a set of military operations, but also as a process of external and internal relocation, the formation of new types of settlements, the establishment of various, including mutually beneficial ties between settlers and the local population. The study also applies retrospective, historical-genetic and systemic methods. The total number of migrants who needed permanent accommodation in the Trans-Kuban settlement was constantly growing, so the issue of allotting them plots of land was acute. One of the solutions to this situation was the construction of new settlements and stanitsas, which was complicated with two serious difficulties: the need for treasury funding and the actual absence of borders between the settlements of the Trans-Kuban settlement and Natukhai auls. Despite the existing difficulties, the leadership of the Black Sea Coastline set a course for the foundation of new strategically important fortified settlements. The completion of all the internal relocations started and the construction of new stanitsas in the 1840s allowed to significantly increase the number of the settled population; improve the defensive capabilities of settlements due to both careful planning of all necessary fortifications and an increase in the number of men; expand the area of land for the establishment of arable land, vegetable gardens, hayfields and pastures and create the necessary foundation for the subsequent food self-sufficiency of the population of the Trans-Kuban settlement.
Introduction
One of the greatest challenges for the Russian and foreign historians remains the study of the peculiarities of the annexation, colonization and development of the lands of the North-Western Caucasus by the Russian Empire in the 19th century, which is covered extensively in pre-revolutionary [1-6], Soviet [7-10] and Russian [11-16] historiography. However, the problem of the foundation and development of the Trans-Kuban settlement, which was located on the lands of the Natukhai people in the famous triangle “Lower Kuban – Anapa – Varenikovskaya Pier”, still remains outside the scope of researchers.
The foundation of the settlement itself became possible only after the conclusion of the Treaty of Adrianople in 1829, under the terms of which the entire eastern shore of the Black Sea from the mouth of the Kuban River to the St. Nicholas Pier passed into the possession of the Russian Empire together with the autochthonous population living there. The territories ceded by the Ottoman Empire included the Adyghe lands. However, the Adygs themselves recognized neither the Russian nor Turkish authorities, since their dependence on the Ottoman Empire in political, economic and cultural terms was rather nominal [17, p. 81].
The rejection of the terms of the peace treaty by the Adygs and their hostility did not allow Russia to immediately establish control over the new lands [18, p. 143]. Such a task could be resolved only as a result of long-term colonization activities that combined military and civilian measures. In order to analyze them, as Thomas Barrett rightly notes, “we need to look beyond the military lines and consider the movement of peoples, their settlements and communities …” [19, p. 165].
The vastness and heterogeneity of the lands of the North-Western Caucasus made it impossible to apply the same methods of development and consolidation of the lands located there as part of the Russian Empire. In our view, the most effective way was the creation of special military-administrative units, such as the Black Sea Coastline (hereinafter as “BSC”) and the Trans-Kuban settlement1.
The author aims to demonstrate the resettlement and colonization capabilities of the Trans-Kuban settlement during the 1840s for understanding the features of populating and development of the lands of the North-Western Caucasus and the north-eastern coast of the Black Sea by the population of the Russian Empire.
The frontier theory is used as a methodological approach, which allows us to consider the Russian advance to the North-Western Caucasus not only as a set of military operations, but also as a process of external and internal relocation, the formation of new types of settlements, the establishment of various, including mutually beneficial, ties between settlers and the local population. The study applies retrospective, historical-genetic and systemic methods.
Development projects of the Trans-Kuban settlement
The BSC included fortifications and fortresses located on a line from Anapa to the St. Nicholas Pier. The coastline was designed to protect against illegal entry into the Russian territory of “any foreign elements” [20, p. 683]. By the forces of its garrisons, extensive development of a small territory of the surrounding area started. The collegiate assessor S.V. Safonov, who surveyed the lands of the eastern shore of the Black Sea in 1836, reported only about the cutting down of the Anapa Forest at a distance of 15 versts to protect against sudden attacks by the mountaineers. After the construction of a small fortification four versts from Anapa, vegetable gardens were laid out there for the needs of the garrison and villagers [21, p. 6]. The vegetables and herbs grown on them were intended to improve the nutrition of the Anapa population. In the remaining fortifications of the line, the development of territories also took place in the form of clearing nearby lands and establishing small vegetable gardens, which were in demand in the summer period [22, p. 72].
More successful development of the lands of the northeastern coast of the Black Sea was associated with the activities of the Trans-Kuban settlement, which appeared in 1835 after the supreme command prohibiting to return state-owned and serf peasants, as well as vagrants who fled to Anapa, but to assign them to the settlement [23, p. 6]. Allotment of plots took place at the expense of both vacant and seized from Natukhai lands.
The influx of new villagers to the Trans-Kuban settlement was constant. The American historian David Moon explains it by the fact that in the 1830s and 1840s, thousands of serfs migrated (i.e. fled) to the North Caucasus, where they founded their own settlements, joined the existing ones or were forced to return to their abandoned homes [24, p. 1]. Some settlers changed their names, patronymics and nicknames, were falsely assigned to other estates, used every opportunity to settle in Anapa or its vicinity [25, p. 76].
In 1836, the first stanitsas appeared as part of the Trans-Kuban settlement – Blagoveshchenskaya and Nikolaevskaya, – and the gradual placement of settlers for permanent residence began. There they could engage in gardening, farming, cattle breeding and fishing, fully providing themselves and small garrisons with all the necessary produce. The safety of the settlers was ensured by the forces of small garrisons stationed on the territory of the settlements, and by the hands of the settlers themselves.
In the second half of the 1830s, as part of the Trans-Kuban settlement, the third and last stanitsa was founded, which received the name Vityazeva in honor of the major who performed the feat in an armed conflict with mountaineers in the vicinity of Anapa. The capacities of the new stanitsa for admitting new residents, as well as those already settled, were quickly exhausted. As a result, during the 1830s the Trans-Kuban settlement did not show any significant success in the development of the territory of the north-eastern coast of the Black Sea for reasons of limited land resources, the presence of a small number of courtyards in the already formed settlements, the influx of a large number of people wishing to settle there and the constant threat of attack from the mountaineers.
Since the late 1830s the Trans-Kuban settlement did not have the capacities for further accommodation of immigrants who wanted to live there. The foundation of small settlements at the stanitsas and fortifications, designed for a small number of families (about 5-10), allowed them to admit only the neediest, but left unresolved the main issue – the resettlement of all people assigned to the Trans-Kuban settlement. As a result, the number of those unsettled was constantly growing.
As of December 1, 1841, stanitsas Nikolaevskaya, Vityazeva, Blagoveshchenskaya, the village of Blagoveshchenskaya Strelka and the settlement at the Dzhimeteiskoye fortification2 were listed as part of the Trans-Kuban settlement. There were 490 families in all these settlements, accounting for 1,832 persons of both sexes and 105 single men. Another 1,529 migrants of both sexes were assigned to the Trans-Kuban settlement, who were forced to live on the territory of the Land of Chernomorksaya Army3 in anticipation of the establishment of new places of settlement. The total number of migrants in need of permanent accommodation was 2,185 persons of both sexes4.
One of the ways out of this situation was the further establishment of new stanitsas and settlements5, which met with at least two serious difficulties. For the resettlement of people listed as part of the Trans-Kuban settlement, as well as those who would like to be assigned to it, allocation of funds from the treasury were required. Residents of Stanitsa Bogoyavlenskoe in Tsebelda in the early 1840s received up to 100 rubles for residential improvement [26, p. 89]. Two years after their resettlement from Abkhazia to Anapa, the sum increased and was issued in two types of benefits: the first was 54 rubles 50 kopecks in banknotes for each family, and the second – 125 rubles in banknotes on loan-like terms6. In total, 24 families were relocated to Anapa7. The sum of only one-time payments for them amounted to 1,308 rubles in banknotes.
The second problem was associated with the actual absence of borders between the settlements of the Trans-Kuban settlement and the Natukhai auls. The residents of the latter did not recognize the occupation of their lands by the settlers and tried to impede the progress by various means. The problem only got worse in the early 1840s, when new villages were to be established as part of the Trans-Kuban settlement, which would displace the lands owned by the Natukhais. The readiness of the latter to start negotiations on the recognition of citizenship in exchange for the non-expansion of Russian settlements was the main reason for the temporary refusal to expand the borders of the Trans-Kuban settlement.
The appointment in the spring of 1843 at the head of the BSC of Major General A.I. Budberg as acting chief brought to life a new project aimed at demarcation of the lands of the Trans-Kuban settlement and the Natukhais. The reasons for his appointment can be considered the commitment of the new leader to building friendly relations with the mountaineers and the desire to give the settlement an orderly and manageable form. Budberg informed L.M. Serebryakov about his intentions in a letter 8.
Pastures for livestock, hayfields and farming lands were all subject to demarcation. By such a measure, the head of the line wanted to gain the Natukhai’s trust, to conciliate the residents of the stanitsas with the mountaineers, and demonstrate to the high authorities the successes achieved by using peaceful means: “…While the field work was carried out under the cover of troops because of the hostile disposition of the Natukhais, it was obviously difficult and even impossible to demarcate the lands of our villagers and the Natukhais. Now, however, with the incessantly increasing rapprochement of the latter with us, I believe that this uncertainty may serve as a reason for the bitterness of the native inhabitants if they do not see the line at which the occupation of their land by our settlers stops...”9.
The initiative of the new head of the line did not find support of his subordinate Rear Admiral L.M. Serebryakov, who repeatedly made campaigns against rebellious auls in the lands of Natukhais. The last of them, prior to receiving a letter from Major General A.I. Budberg, fell in the spring of 1842. His goal was to build fortifications on the Gastogai River and at the Varenikova Pier [27, p. 53].
In a response letter, Rear Admiral L.M. Serebryakov opined that demarcation of lands between the Trans-Kuban settlement and Natukhai auls was premature. He argued his position with two personal observations. The first was made during the inspection of the Kuban plain north of the Gastogai River. There he discovered the presence of a significant area of virgin land, which had not been used for pastures or haymaking and could serve as a reserve to meet the needs of the Natukhais. His second argument was the beginning of the land displacement of the settlers by the mountaineers, which took place in 1842-1843. It was conducted in the form of occupation for their arable land of those areas that were previously used by residents of the villages for haymaking.
L.M. Serebryakov also believed that demarcation would lead to serious obligations on the part of the head of the BSC and the administration of the Trans-Kuban settlement to Natukhai residents, which would not allow, if necessary, to quickly increase the area of settlements: “... Limiting the occupation of Natukhai lands is a premature measure and in the course of things is more harmful than useful, especially when it is unknown how far we plan to expand our settlements, because once we limit ourselves in certain borders, it will be very difficult to expand them in the future”.10
Major General A.I. Budberg agreed with the Rear Admiral L.M. Serebryakov’s argumentation. His project of demarcation of the lands of the Trans-Kuban settlement and Natukhai villages remained unrealized. As a result, the idea of further expansion of the settlement territory was brought back to life through the foundation of new villages and settlements and populating settlers in them, who had been waiting for several years after identifying themselves as a Trans-Kuban settlement in order to receive land plots. The realization of this idea fell on the 1840s and allowed to significantly expand the capabilities of the Trans-Kuban settlement regarding land development, improvements in their productivity and consolidation as part of the Russian Empire.
The foundation of Stanitsa Suvorovskaya
Correspondence regarding the possibility of establishing a new stanitsa on the Suvorov battery began on December 31, 1840 with the order of the head of the Caucasian region, Adjutant-General P.H. Grabbe, addressed to the head of the BSC, Lieutenant General N.N. Rayevsky. In January 1841, the latter resigned [28, p. 79], and Adjutant-General I.R. Anrep took the position of acting chief. He saw the foundation of a new stanitsa in the improvement of the situation in which the population of Anapa and surrounding settlements found themselves in due to the lack of troops to protect them: “... The garrison that we now have in Anapa is hardly enough to protect existing villages, and it is impossible to think about the establishment of new ones. The Suvorov battery is about 25 versts from Anapa, on the eastern side of the Kiziltash Liman, not covered by anything...”11.
I.R. Anrep also considered the lack of land to be an obstacle to the foundation of a new stanitsa. He saw a way out of this situation in the implementation of the project of establishing a permanent land connection between Novorossiysk and Chernomoriya through the Varenikovskaya Pier on the Kuban River. The connection was to be protected by specially erected fortifications for this purpose. In this case, already established stanitsas and future settlements would receive reliable protection and extensive land.
Rear Admiral L.M. Serebryakov shared the same view with Adjutant-General I.R. Anrep: “... The construction of a fortification on Gostagai and a fortified bridge on Varenikova Pier would be extremely useful in many respects under the present circumstances ... we would acquire 25 versts of excellent lands for farming and would cover the Anapa settlement, which, in the present miserable situation, can hardly exist in constant fear and poverty ...” [29, p. 520]. All these proposals correlated with the ideas of Emperor Nicholas I on the gradual annexation of the Natukhai lands [30, p. 118]. They began to be implemented in the summer of 1842, when a fortification of the same name was built on the Gostagai River [31, p. 106].
As already mentioned earlier, at the end of 1841, there were 2,185 persons of both sexes who needed to be accommodated in the Trans-Kuban settlement. The capacities of already established stanitsas and settlements were almost exhausted. There were 859 residents of both sexes in Stanitsa Vityazeva, 450 in Mykolaiv, and 174 in Blagoveshchenskaya12. In order to resettle all those assigned to the Trans-Kuban settlement, it was necessary to additionally find at least two stanitsas comparable in size to Vityazeva, or about four – to Mykolaiv.
The discussion of the question of the construction of a stanitsa on the Suvorov battery was resumed in early 1843. The actualization of this project was explained by at least three reasons. Firstly, there was a further increase in the population of the Trans-Kuban settlement due to the birth of children among immigrants and the migration of the population of the central and southern provinces. The entire flow of new residents could not be accommodated in already established villages. Secondly, after the construction of the Gostagaevsky fortification, all obstacles to increasing the territory of the Trans-Kuban settlement, which were put forward by the head of the line, disappeared. Thirdly, the expansion of the Trans-Kuban settlement began to be seen as an instrument of pressure on the Natukhais, who negotiated the terms of the allegiance, but never adhered to them: “... it was obvious that there was no sincerity on their part in these negotiations, but only a desire to gain more time and finish all their field work ...”13
The question of the need to build a village on the Suvorov battery was raised by the head of the BSC, Adjutant-General I.R. Anrep. The idea was supported by L.M. Serebryakov, who drew up a detailed project: “... The need to relocate Maloross settlers from Anapa and the accommodation of families in Chernomoriya, the inability to settle them at the former stanitsas, – due to lack and depletion of arable lands, – these two circumstances make it inevitable to occupy a new settlement, – in the absence of a more convenient one, – in the tract of the Suvorov battery ...”14.
The convenience of the chosen place was explained by the small amount of work that was necessary to turn the future village into a fortified position on the bank of the Kiziltash estuary. Its rather steep and elevated banks could provide security of the village from the rear. The few and convenient descents from the coastal hills were supposed to be made inaccessible by fortification techniques. The material for strengthening and protecting the village was planned to be collected in its vicinity, where willow, reeds, brushwood and stone were found.
Additional protection for the village was to be provided by a mound located 2-3 versts away east. Its dominance over the terrain allowed it to have a view at the adjacent plain between the Kuban region and Stanitsa Vityazeva. The construction of a signal stone tower or redoubt on the mound with a permanent garrison of 10-15 people armed with a gun allowed not only to have an eye on the surrounding area, but also to ensure the protection of wandering groups of future settlers and themselves during field work.
The garrison of the stanitsa on the Suvorov battery was not supposed to be too large. According to the calculations of Rear Admiral L.M. Serebryakov, it was enough to contain 70-80 infantry, a Cossack cavalry of 20-30 horsemen and one field gun. To protect the territory of the village, it was proposed to use only five fortress guns. The required number of infantry was to be withdrawn from the garrison of the Dzhimeteiskoye fortification15.
The proposed security measures were quite adequate. Natukhai residents periodically attacked the Trans-Kuban settlements. Less than a year after its foundation, Stanitsa Suvorovskaya, as well as Nikolaevskaya and Vityazeva were attacked. In a one-day battle in the vicinity of Suvorovskaya, 1 Cossack and 1 sergeant-major were killed, 1 Cossack sergeant, 3 clerks, 4 Cossacks were wounded, 7 Cossacks and privates were shell-shocked [29, p. 904]. The village was not ravaged, as all residents capable of carrying weapons participated in its defense.
Rear Admiral L.M. Serebryakov also calculated the preliminary capacity of the planned village. He believed that at the beginning of its occupation, no more than 160 families could settle there. The main constraint was the amount of arable land available. The optimal option was to provide arable land not only for the new residents of the village, but also for the villagers from Vityazeva, which was located at a distance of 12 versts.
In January 1843, the proposals of Rear Admiral L.M. Serebryakov were sent to Adjutant-General I.R. Anrep and the commander of the troops on the Caucasian line and in Chernomoriya, Lieutenant General V.I. Gurko. Approved by all instances, they were received on January 28 at the office of the Minister of War under the title “On the arrangement of the village near the Suvorov battery near the Kiziltash Liman”.
The project’s progress stalled due to the fact that the Secretary of War Prince A.I. Chernyshev was waiting for an opportunity to report to the emperor. On April 6, 1843, an official response was drawn up in the office of the War Ministry to an earlier project draft, in which it was reported that “... His Majesty finds it very beneficial and fully agrees with the matter regarding the possession of the entire Kuban Liman, the cover from the attacks of mountaineers on Stanitsa Blagoveshchenskaya and settlement on the Schastlivyi Island, as well as the expansion of arable lands of Stanitsa Vityazeva...”16.
With the receipt of the official response, the Anapa Provisional Government initiated all the necessary preparations. They included a detailed survey of the area to determine the boundaries of the future settlement and the organization of its defense, as well as the selection of settlers willing to live in a new place. The task was complicated by several circumstances. Firstly, only family villagers were needed, since there were a limited number of houses being built. Secondly, some of the families assigned to the Trans-Kuban settlement lived in Chernomoriya. Thirdly, the officials sought to settle trustworthy villagers who had the necessary equipment and property. A survey of all those who lived in Anapa and were assigned to the Tran-Kuban settlement revealed 119 suitable Maloross families and 40 Kharkiv ones.
The main works on the construction of Stanitsa Suvorovskaya fell on June – August 1843. Future settlers, workmen from Anapa, residents of neighboring villages, single migrants and those who had penalties for certain offenses were all involved in the works. At the end of August 1843, Rear Admiral L.M. Serebryakov visited the new village. In a report addressed to the head of the BSC, he reported on the state of the new settlement. It numbered 161 families. The total number of inhabitants was estimated at 686 persons of both sexes.
Of them, 40 families were still in Chernomoriya, where they were engaged in harvesting and disposing of their property17. The work in the village was far from finished, but it had already acquired a residential appearance with properly marked blocks, wicker (turluch) and brick houses and areas for public buildings.
The foundation of Stanitsa Alexandrovskaya
A proposal to build a settlement near the Alekseevsky redoubt18 was received from Rear Admiral L.M. Serebryakov in May 1843, addressed to the acting head of the line, Major General A.I. Budrberg. At that time, the construction of the future Stanitsa Suvorovskaya had already been actively planned. Once again, L.M. Serebryakov’s project was worked out in detail, and its implementation promised to improve the situation in the entire Trans-Kuban settlement at minimal costs for the line and the Anapa Provisional Government.
The author of the project saw the main prerequisite for its implementation in the presence of a large number of persons who were assigned to the Trans-Kuban settlement, but did not have a permanent place to settle. According to L.M. Serebryakov, more than 100 families of 720 people of both sexes and more than 300 single males lived in Chernomoriya alone. To this number he added 60 families comprising of 230 people, who temporarily lived at Stanitsa Blagoveshchenskaya and in the Dzhimeteiskoye fortification19, that is, in the case of the foundation of new spacious settlements, the Trans-Kuban settlement could immediately increase by a total of 1,250 inhabitants.
The increase in the number of settled villagers at the same time could contribute to a better protection of the villagers themselves from the mountaineers’ attacks due to the fact that all those capable of owning weapons were involved in the protection and joint reflection of military danger. In peacetime, the Trans-Kuban settlement would receive an expansion of arable lands, vegetable gardens, hayfields and pastures and an increase in the total volume of grain produced by the settlers necessary not only to meet their own needs, but also to supply the inhabitants of Anapa and the garrisons of the fortifications of the BSC.
The settlement near the Alekseevsky redoubt was planned to be built on the southwestern tip of the Kiziltash Liman next to Stanitsa Vityazeva. It was supposed to be surrounded by a deep ditch and rampart. The defense was reinforced by two small bastions or a small signal redoubt. Up to 20 families of villagers settled behind the first bastion, and barracks and stables for the garrison were built behind the second. The latter was transferred to a new settlement from the fortification of Dzhimeteiskoye, which was to be abolished due to the unfavorable tactical position. The favourable position of the bastions in the village would ensure its connection with the stanitsas of Vityazeva, Vityazevsky signal redoubt, Nasheburg redoubt and a stone tower built on the seashore. As a result, neighboring settlements would be visible from each point and the entire interior space would be open for constant observation and prevention of attacks from the mountaineers.
L.M. Serebryakov proposed to start settling residents near the Alekseevsky redoubt that year, believing that this measure would not require large expenses from the treasury and would be carried out by the villagers themselves: “... The settlement of villagers at the Alekseevsky redoubt does not present any specific obstacles, and can be started now, leaving the families to settle themselves gradually and, by their own means, without any allowance from the treasury. Therefore, as soon as Your Excellency issues a permission, I will propose that the Anapa Provisional Government immediately proceed with the accommodation of families and the allocation of living spaces...”20.
The proposed project was very tempting in terms of minimizing costs on the part of the treasury, the need to allocate additional military forces to protect the future settlement, relying on the villagers’ own forces. Nevertheless, Major General A.I. Budberg did not approve it. The main reason was clearly the focus on the construction of the stanitsa on the Suvorov battery, which came from the scale of the settlement, the absence of such practice for several years (the last village was built in 1837) and great responsibility to the high authorities, who allowed the expansion of the Trans-Kuban settlement.
Correspondence on the construction of a new settlement between the head of the BSC, the Anapa Provisional Government and Rear Admiral L.M. Serebryakov proceeded until April 20, 1844. Authorizing the construction and settlement of the population, A.I. Budberg insisted that the capacity of the village should be increased to 25 families, provided that enough suitable land was available for them.
Such an increase was justified due to the significance of the settlers who had not yet been settled, but, according to the Anapa Provisional Government, not all of them wanted to make up the population of the Alekseevsky settlement. Based on the report of the ataman of the Anapa villagers dated February 12, 1844, it became known that only 11 families wanted to move from Anapa to the new settlement. The total number of those interested was 36 people (24 men and 12 women). Such a number was clearly insufficient.
Having received the permission from A.I. Budberg at the beginning of the construction of the settlement, L.M. Serebryakov immediately gave all the necessary orders to the Anapa Provisional Government. However, the construction of the village near the Alekseevsky redoubt was slow. By September 1844, only 5 huts were built there and only part of the ditch was dug. Even with the most modest estimates, there should have been at least 11 houses in the village to ensure the resettlement of all families.
The works on fortification of the settlement included digging a deep ditch and erecting a high rampart, which would enhance the security of residents, but required long-term joint efforts. The shortage of labor was compensated by attracting the population of all the already built villages, settlements and residents of the Anapa fortress for three-day works. People who committed offenses and violated the rules that existed in the Trans-Kuban settlement were engaged for a longer period.
During the subsequent survey of the area and the drawing of its plan, it was revealed that there was a sufficient amount of land in the vicinity that can be allotted to future residents. As a result, another correction of its capacity was made. Now it was supposed to settle 35 families in it.
The construction of the settlement near the Alekseevsky redoubt was officially completed in September of 1845. By this time, 37 families had settled in it, which exceeded even the boldest assumptions of L.M. Serebryakov about the number of the population. Because of poverty, some of the villagers united and built housing for two families at once. The result of such cooperation was the construction of 32 houses for 37 families. A total of 134 residents were settled in the village.
On March 20, 1846, with the permission of the Governor of the Caucasus, the Alekseevsky redoubt was transformed into a village. At the request of the authorities, it was proposed to name it Alexandrovskaya in honor of the head of the BSC A.I. Budberg. In the report of the latter dated May 10 of the same year, it was reported about the enforcement of the proposal of the Governor of the Caucasus regarding the name of the village21.
Conclusion
The Trans-Kuban settlement existed from the second half of the 1830s until the middle of 1855. During the Crimean War, the military command was forced to evacuate garrisons and civilians due to the threat of the Anglo-French landing. After the end of the war, the government initiated a new stage of colonization and development of the lands of the Northwest Caucasus. On the site of the former Trans-Kuban settlement, new settlements with residents – representatives of various peoples – were built.
In this regard, we believe that the 1840s is the most successful period for the Trans-Kuban settlement in terms of expanding its territory by establishing new settlements and admitting the population assigned to it. It was at this time that two of the five villages that formed the basis of the Trans-Kuban settlement were built, the foundation of small settlements designed for 5-10 families practically ceased, and the number of settled population that had been waiting for their turn for several years increased significantly. Moreover, the successful completion of the construction of stanitsas Suvorovskaya and Alexandrovskaya made it possible to improve the defensive capabilities of settlements due to both careful planning of all the necessary fortifications and the increase in the number of males capable of carrying weapons. After the foundation of the new stanitsas, an expansion of the area of land used for arable plots, vegetable gardens, hayfields and pastures took place. Eventually, the necessary foundation was laid for the subsequent food self-sufficiency of the population of the Trans-Kuban settlement and the nearby fortifications of the Black Sea Coastline.
1. In the sources of the 1830s and early 1840s – the Anapa settlement.
2. This spelling is found in official documents.
3. Documents of the period under review most often mention the settlement simply as Chernomoriya.
4. Correspondence about the resettlement of peasants of the Voronezh province beyond the Kuban region // Russian State Military Historical Archive (RGVIA). F. 788. Inv. 1. File 8. L. 11.
5. According to the members of the Anapa Provisional Government, 2,185 people of both sexes in 1841 were quite enough to establish a new large stanitsa.
6. The second benefit was issued for a period of 4 years, but without interest payments. The benefit was stipulated to be used for the purchase of livestock and inventory.
7. The report of the chief of the Black Sea Coastline on the resettlement of the inhabitants of Stanitsa Bogoyavlenskoe to Stanitsa Nikolaevskaya near Anapa // State Archive of the Krasnodar Territory (GAKK). F. 260. Inv. 2. File 81. L. 19.
8. During the period under review, Rear Admiral L.M. Serebryakov served as head of the I Detachment of the Black Sea Coastline.
9. Report on the allocation of land to the Transkuban settlers // RGVIA. F. 788. Inv. 1. File 20. L. 1-1 back side. Hereafter, the spelling and punctuation of the citation source are verbatim.
10. Report on the allocation of land to the Transkuban settlers // RGVIA. F. 788. Inv. 1. File 20. L. 3 back side.
11. Correspondence about the foundation of a stanitsa on the Suvorov battery for Trans-Kuban settlers // RGVIA. F. 788. Inv. 1. File 11. L. 3.
12. Correspondence about the resettlement of peasants of the Voronezh province beyond the Kuban region // Russian State Military Historical Archive (RGVIA). F. 788. Inv. 1. File 8. L. 11.
13. Report on the allocation of land to the Transkuban settlers // RGVIA. F. 788. Inv. 1. File 20. L. 2 back side.
14. Correspondence about the foundation of a stanitsa on the Suvorov battery for Trans-Kuban settlers // RGVIA. F. 788. Inv. 1. File 11. L. 5.
15. Correspondence about the foundation of a stanitsa on the Suvorov battery for Trans-Kuban settlers // RGVIA. F. 788. Inv. 1. File 11. L. 6 back side.
16. Correspondence about the foundation of a stanitsa on the Suvorov battery for Trans-Kuban settlers // RGVIA. F. 788. Inv. 1. File 11. L. 13.
17. Correspondence about the foundation of a stanitsa on the Suvorov battery for Trans-Kuban settlers // RGVIA. F. 788. Inv. 1. File 11. L. 78 back side.
18. The official name of the settlement until March 1846.
19. Correspondence about the establishment of the settlement near the Alekseevsky redoubt and about the settlement of the Trans-Kuban settlers in it // RGVIA. F. 788. Inv. 1. File. 22. L. 1.
20. Correspondence about the establishment of the settlement near the Alekseevsky redoubt and about the settlement of the Trans-Kuban settlers in it // RGVIA. F. 788. Inv. 1. File. 22. L. 3.
21. Correspondence about the establishment of the settlement near the Alekseevsky redoubt and about the settlement of the Trans-Kuban settlers in it // RGVIA. F. 788. Inv. 1. File. 22. L. 23.
Sergey N. Shapovalov
Kuban State University
Author for correspondence.
Email: shapovalov07@gmail.com
ORCID iD: 0000-0003-0605-191X
SPIN-code: 9942-5642
ResearcherId: GXV-6386-2022
https://www.kubsu.ru/ru/fismo/shapovalov-sergey-nikolaevich
Russian Federation, 149, Stavropolskaya St., Krasnodar, 350040, Russia
Cand. Sci. (History),
Associate Professor of Department of History of Russia
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